Non-social human beings in the original position by Edward, Terence Rajivan
T.R. Edward 
1 
 
Non-social human beings in the original position 
 
Author: Terence Rajivan Edward, University of Manchester. 
Abstract. This paper argues that Rawls must commit himself to non-social human beings to 
defend his original position procedure. 
 
 In this paper I contribute to answering the question, is the philosopher John Rawls 
committed to the possibility of human beings who are not social beings? The answer depends 
on what exactly is meant by ‘not social beings.’ Perhaps it also depends on which of Rawls’s 
texts one focuses on. I argue that in order to defend proposals made in his classic book A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls needs to take on a certain commitment, and it makes sense to 
describe this as a commitment to non-social human beings. An argument has already been 
made for a similar conclusion (Sandel 1984: 86-87), an argument which has been contested 
(Edwin Baker 1985: 900), but my argument below is quite different. 
 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls asserts that a society should be just (1999: 3-4). Here 
we can take ‘just’ as another word for fair. Rawls also presents a method for determining 
which principles should be implemented by the major institutions of a society, in order for the 
society to be just (1999: 118). The method is to imagine a certain situation, called the original 
position. We are to imagine some individuals coming together to form a society and deciding 
on an agreement. The agreement concerns how the major institutions of that society will 
distribute rights, duties and the benefits of social cooperation. But the individuals we are to 
imagine are very different from us in certain respects. Each individual does not know various 
features of themselves, features which if known might lead them to try to make an agreement 
that favours individuals with those particular features. One feature that individuals in the 
original position do not know is their talents. If an individual knows that they have a certain 
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talent, for writing with perfect grammar say, they might promote an agreement which favours 
individuals with this talent, for instance one which says that only individuals with this talent 
can be members of the government. Apart from talents, there are other features of themselves 
that individuals in the original position do not know: their sex, their race, their income, and 
more. Rawls describes them as being behind a veil of ignorance. By considering what such 
individuals would agree to, we can realize what would be a just agreement for how the major 
social institutions should distribute rights, duties and the benefits of social cooperation. The 
agreement would be just because these individuals lack knowledge of features that might lead 
them to be biased. 
 This in broad outline is Rawls’s method. There are a lot of details and qualifications 
that can be added to the outline. I shall focus on one particular detail. Each individual in the 
original position does not know their views about what would be a good life for them (1999: 
118). For example, if one individual believes that a pudding after dinner is essential to a good 
life for them, they do not know that. If they knew that, they might try to promote an 
agreement which ensures that the society is always well-stocked with pudding ingredients. 
 From this example, it may seem that Rawls is right to imagine individuals in the 
original position as lacking knowledge about their views regarding what would be a good life 
for them. But are there not some very general views regarding what would be a good life that 
are shared by all individuals, or at least all adult individuals without severe psychological 
disorders? Someone might think as follows. The individuals we are to imagine in the original 
position are adult human individuals. If you gave a human being a choice between living 
completely alone, cut off from all other human beings, and living as a member of society, 
presumably a sane adult would prefer to live in a society, so long as they are not subject to 
especially brutal treatment. And they would prefer this partly, maybe even wholly, because 
they want communication or interaction with other human beings. The kind and degree of 
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communication or interaction that one person
1
 wants and that another person wants may not 
be the same. But presumably they would all want some kind of communication or interaction 
with other human beings and would regard this as essential to a good life for them. (I am not 
sure whether there can be non-interactive communication or non-communicative interaction, 
so I have written of ‘communication or interaction.’) 
 Contemporary political philosophers use the term ‘perfectionists’ to label those who 
allow for a view of the good life to be involved when deciding government policies. Since 
some such views are quite moderate and since the term ‘perfectionist’ sounds as if it refers to 
an extreme type of person, this term does not seem very suitable. But this is the terminology 
in place and I shall work with it. The proposal above is a proposal for a perfectionist version 
of the original position. It allows for individuals in that position to appeal to the view that 
communication or interaction with other human beings is essential to a good life. 
This perfectionist version may well have different outcomes to Rawls’s version. If 
individuals in the original position know that they are forming a society partly, or wholly, 
because of desires for communication or interaction, it makes sense for them to agree to 
policies that help protect against a life in which these things are absent or too little. The 
agreement Rawls recommends provides no protection against this. 
 How can Rawls defend his version of the original position from a perfectionist 
variation
2
 on it? Here is the simplest answer I can think of: “Given that there are hermits, it is 
possible that there are some people who value being part of society but only because of 
certain material benefits it brings, such as security and the opportunities to obtain food. They 
have no interest in communication or interaction. If they could somehow get the same 
benefits in another way, then they may well choose to leave society, but at present there is no 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, I shall use ‘person’ to mean human being, although I think there can be non-human persons. 
2
 There is another perfectionist version, which only allows for the view that interaction or communication is 
essential for a good life. It omits the ‘with other human beings’ component. For some individuals that 
component may be essential, but this perfectionist version does not assume it to be essential for all. 
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other way to get these benefits. If we allow individuals in the original position to work with 
the view that communication or interaction is essential to a good life for them, we would be 
biased against such people. We should not be biased against them, so we should work with 
my version of the original position, which does not allow this view.” 
I think Rawlsians will prefer a moderated version of this answer, according to which 
it is plausible that there could be human beings who fit the description above, sufficiently 
plausible that we have to avoid bias against such individuals, even if we are not fully sure that 
they can exist. 
 There are two objections that I can anticipate towards this defence. First, it may be 
objected that the kind of person described above is impossible. But Rawls can say that this 
judgement is based on a very controversial claim about human nature, the kind of claim that 
it is not appropriate to rely on when determining which principles should be implemented by 
society. We must derive these principles from appropriate foundations, foundations that are 
sound and which citizens can be expected to accept, and such a controversial claim is not an 
appropriate foundation.
3
 
 The second objection is that a person who does not value communication or 
interaction as essential for a good life is suffering from an extreme psychological disorder, 
and so we should discount their view about what would be a good life for them when 
designing the original position. This does not mean we should ignore the view in all contexts, 
but we can deal with it at a later point, rather than when working out which principles the 
major social institutions should implement.  
Much the same response can be given to the second objection as was given to the 
first. It is very controversial to claim that a person who values being part of society because 
of certain material benefits it brings, but does not value communication or interaction as 
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 I do not wish to claim that the debate ends here. Perhaps the objector can challenge this response. See the next 
footnote. 
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essential to a good life for them, must be suffering from an extreme psychological disorder. 
This is not a claim that we can rely on when trying to determine which principles the major 
social institutions should implement.
4
 
Before concluding this paper, I want to consider some suggestive material from 
Rawls. At one point in A Theory of Justice, Rawls imagines a person whose nature means that 
he does not regard communication or interaction as essential to a good life for him. Rawls 
imagines such a person, but without explicitly committing himself to this person being 
genuinely possible. He imagines someone who solves mathematical problems for a living, but 
whose sole pleasure is to count grass, grass which is in neatly-shaped areas (1999: 379). This 
person solves mathematical problems to fund the pursuit of his grass-counting pleasure. 
Rawls makes some suggestive remarks about this case: 
Perhaps he is peculiarly neurotic and in early life acquired an aversion to 
human fellowship, and so he counts blades of grass to avoid having to deal 
with other people. But if we allow that his nature is to enjoy this activity and 
not to enjoy any other, and that there is no feasible way to alter his condition, 
then surely a rational plan for him will center around this activity. (1999: 379-
380) 
Probably some people would describe this person as mad. Rawls describes the person he 
imagines as ‘peculiarly neurotic,’ rather than using a term to indicate problems of a more 
severe kind. And he seems prepared to treat them much like any other citizen of society, if 
they are prepared to follow its rules and accept the importance of society being just. 
There seems to be a gap between how the second objector and Rawls respond to the 
same kind of case. The gap involves the psychological theses they are attracted to: this person 
is suffering from an extreme mental disorder, versus this person is neurotic. It also involves 
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 But if Rawlsians are prepared to defer to expert opinion on man-made climate change, then why not do so on 
this issue as well? This is a question that they must address. 
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the relevance for political philosophy: we do not have to take into account this person’s views 
when working out principles for the major social institutions, versus we have to take into 
account this person as well. Assuming an acceptance of the original position, this gap will 
lead to other divergences: a perfectionist original position versus a non-perfectionist one; 
principles that aim to ensure that everyone gets communication or interaction versus 
principles that do not; perhaps a government that aims to reduce the levels of social isolation 
within some parts of the population, such as senior citizens, versus a government that does 
not. One might compare this to two roads, which begin close together, but gradually move 
further apart. 
 Even if Rawls did not include the grass-counter example and his suggestive remarks 
on it, I see no way for him to defend his version of the original position without saying the 
following: it is plausible that there could be human beings who do not value communication 
or interaction as essential to a good life, sufficiently plausible that we must take them into 
account and cannot be biased against them, when designing the original position. A short way 
of capturing this commitment is to present it as a commitment to non-social human beings, 
but we must be careful to remember exactly what this means here. The term ‘non-social 
human being’ is being used to refer, more specifically, to a human being who does not value 
communication or interaction as essential to a good life for them, who is not suffering from 
an extreme psychological disorder and who is not mistaken about what kind of life they can 
enjoy. Strictly speaking, Rawls does not have to assert that there could be non-social human 
beings, but he has to regard the view that there could be such people as plausible, plausible 
enough for him to design the original position so as to avoid bias against any such people. 
And if one is trying to avoid bias against them, this seems barely distinguishable from 
treating non-social human beings as possible. 
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